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Abstract    
 
This paper reviews and draws lessons on health financing reforms in seven countries 
in South East Asia which have sought to reduce dependence on out-of-pocket 
payments and increase pooled health finance.  The resource-poor countries, 
Cambodia and Lao, have relied largely on donor-supported Health Equity Funds to 
target the poor, and reliable funding and appropriate identification of the eligible 
poor are two major challenges for nationwide scaling-up.  Payroll-tax-financed social 
health insurance is commonly applied to formal sector employees (Malaysia 
excepted), with varying outcomes in term of financial protection.  Alternative 
payment methods have different implications for provider behaviour and financial 
protection.  Two alternative approaches for financial protection of the non-poor 
outside the formal sector have emerged, contributory arrangements and tax-
financed schemes, with differing abilities to achieve universal coverage rapidly.  
Fiscal space and mobilization of payroll contributions are both important in 
accelerating universal coverage.   As reform is complex, institutional capacity to 
generate evidence and inform policy is essential and should be strengthened.    
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1. Introduction  
 
The high level of household out-of-pocket payment for medical bills, resulting in 
household financial disruption and impoverishment, was a key motive for the 
adoption in 2005 of a World Health Assembly Resolution on financial protection [1].  
Countries in South East Asia, hosting 8.7% of the world’s population and with fast 
economic growth and a moderate poverty level of 14.6%, have high potential to 
accelerate financial risk protection and achieve universal coverage.  Figure 1 lays out 
what is required to achieve universal coverage: (1) adequate service coverage, e.g. 
a comprehensive package of services and adequate financial protection, on the 
horizontal axis and (2) increased population coverage, on the vertical axis[2].  The 
key issue in resource poor settings is the choice between providing a high level of 
service and financial protection for a limited group of the population, versus 
extending a high level of population coverage but with limited services and financial 
protection.   
 
<Figure 1 here> 
 
This paper assesses approaches to financing reform and progress towards universal 
coverage in seven low- and middle-income countries in South East Asia, excluding 
two high income countries [Brunei and Singapore] and Myanmar where limited 
information is available.  Based on documentary analysis, the paper reviews 
achievements and identifies challenges with respect to population coverage, service 
coverage and financial protection, in order to share lessons and inform the financing 
reform efforts of countries outside the region.    
 
Universal coverage is defined as securing access by all citizens to appropriate 
promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative services at an affordable cost [3].  
Prospects of progress towards this aspiration seem gloomy [4] particularly where 
government fiscal capacity is limited and Social Health Insurance for the employed 
sector is absent or very small, so limiting the mobilization of additional resources 
from payroll contributions.  Financing healthcare in most developing countries 
heavily relies on out-of-pocket payments [5], with most donors and Global Health 
Initiatives such as the Global Fund focusing on specific diseases or interventions 
rather than the broader health system.   
 
In achieving Universal Coverage, three broad dimensions are required, (a) extend 
population coverage by health insurance or other forms of prepayment schemes, (b) 
determine which types of services to be covered and ensure quality services are 
available, (c) provide better financial risk protection.  The less copayment by users 
and the more comprehensive service coverage—the higher levels of financial risk 
protection.  This paper concentrates discussion along these three dimensions, See 
Figure 2  
 
<Figure 2 here>  
 
Countries with a high share of out-of-pocket payments are more likely to have a high 
proportion of households facing catastrophic health expenditure, defined as spending 
on health more than 40% of household consumption expenditure excluding food, or 
more than 10% of household consumption expenditure [6]. A one percent increase in 
the proportion of out-of-pocket payments in total health expenditure is associated 
with a 2.2% increase in the proportion of households facing catastrophic health 
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payments.  The larger the share of prepayment in healthcare financing, the smaller 
the proportion of households that will face catastrophic health spending [7].   
 
However, the existence of prepayment does not guarantee financial protection.  
Inadequate financial protection has been reported from some prepayment schemes.  
For example, 15% of those enrolled in the insurance scheme of the Self Employed 
Women’s Association in India experienced a financially catastrophic level of payment 
even after reimbursement for hospital admission [8]; and the Chinese Rural 
Cooperative Medical Systems cover only 30% of inpatient expenditure [9].  Impact 
assessment of the Health Care Fund for the Poor in Vietnam using government 
revenues to finance the poor and ethnic minorities in selected mountainous provinces 
suggests that the Fund has not reduced average out of pocket spending and had 
negligible impacts on utilization among the poorest deciles, though substantially 
increased service utilization and reduced the risk of catastrophic spending was 
observed [10].   
 
 
2. Country background   
 
Seven countries in South East Asia with differing levels of economic development and 
pace of expansion of health service coverage and financial protection were selected 
as case studies: two low income countries with low coverage (Cambodia and Lao), 
and five middle income countries, three with more than 50% coverage and clear 
policies towards universal coverage (Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam), and two 
who have achieved universal coverage (Malaysia and Thailand).   
 
Table 1 shows the wide variation in economic and poverty indicators amongst the 
countries.  Fiscal space, the government’s ability to collect tax and spend for desired 
purposes, measured as a share of GDP, ranges from 8.2% in Cambodia to 16.8% in 
Thailand (in contrast to the OECD average of 37.4% in 2000) [11].   
 
<Table 1 here> 
 
Poverty incidence not only reflects the number of people who cannot afford to pay 
when they are sick, but also indicates the magnitude of the health budget required if 
governments decide to subsidise them.  This puts pressure on the limited fiscal space 
and in poor countries like Cambodia and Lao, funding from donors is inevitable.   
 
 
3. Current health financing challenges  
 
Two dimensions of challenges are assessed: level and profiles of health expenditure 
and population coverage by insurance schemes.     
 
3.1 Level and profile of health expenditure 
 
Private health expenditure plays a dominant role in financing healthcare in 5 of the 7 
countries, contributing more than 70% of total spending in Cambodia and Lao (Table 
2) [12], though the level of catastrophic health expenditure differs between these 
countries, being 5% of households in Cambodia and 10.5% in Vietnam [13].  Less 
than 9% of the government budget is allocated to health in 5 of the 7 countries, the 
only exceptions being Cambodia (since government funding includes donor support 
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channelled through government) and Thailand.  The high level of external resources 
from donors in Cambodia (16.4% of total health expenditure) and Lao (14.5%)  
poses questions about not only long term sustainability but also the extent to which 
donor funded programmes are in line with national priorities [14].   
 
<Table 2 here> 
 
Payroll-tax financed social health insurance ranges from none in Cambodia to 12.7% 
of total health expenditure in Vietnam.  Malaysia - an upper middle income country 
with a high level of formal sector employment – has yet to establish a social health 
insurance scheme and such spending was only 0.4% of total health expenditure.  
Despite the well established schemes in the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, their 
spending were below the lower middle income country group average of 15.8% of 
total health expenditure, reflecting either or both of lower a more limited benefit 
package.   
 
Total health expenditure per capita in three of the countries, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
and Lao, is below the minimum US$49-54 per capita [15] estimated to be necessary 
to provide the interventions and health system platform necessary to meet the MDGs  
 
  
3.2 Population coverage by financial protection schemes 
 
Table 3 provides the best estimates of insurance coverage for the country 
populations categorised into four relevant groups for 2009 based on survey or 
administrative data.  Due to the different pace of population coverage expansion, the 
total insured population varies greatly, with low coverage in Cambodia and Lao, 
medium coverage in Indonesia and Vietnam, and high coverage in Philippines and 
Thailand.   
 
The substantial size of the uninsured population, 92.3% in Lao, 76% in Cambodia, 
52% in Indonesia and 45% in Vietnam, combined with the high level of out-of-
pocket payments, put the uninsured population at risk of financial impoverishment or 
non use of necessary health care.  Social health insurance coverage is low due to the 
small size of the formal sector.      
 
<Table 3 here> 
 
4. Coverage and financial risk protection extension: efforts and 
challenges towards universal coverage  
 
The two most often used formal financing approaches are (a) social health insurance 
for formal sector employees, and (b) general tax finance for the poor and vulnerable, 
since it is generally accepted that they are the legitimate responsibility of 
government.  Given these approaches, the coverage of the informal sector is a major 
challenge, described as “squeezing the middle” at a recent conference [16], the 
middle layer referring to the non-poor or not so poor informal sector, while the top 
layer consists of formal sector employees and the bottom layer comprises the poor.   
 
For clarity, Social Health Insurance is defined as payroll tax financed scheme for 
employees in the public or private sector; where a certain portion of the employee 
salary was mandatory deducted, the employer also contributes equal or higher 
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portion.  In some countries the government also contributes.  In contrast, tax-
financed non-contributory schemes are often designed to provide protection for the 
poor and the vulnerable, or provide partial subsidies for the informal sector using 
general tax revenue through annual budgeting processes.   
 
Table 4 slightly re-categorises the population groups to distinguish the economically 
active (formal and informal sectors) from the poor and rest of the population, and 
depicts their size.  The ‘rest of the population’ includes non poor children and elderly 
dependants and other economically inactive populations.  The poor include children 
and elderly dependants and poor in the informal sector.  Despite the complexity of 
potential overlapping populations across these four broad groups, this categorization 
is useful to inform policy on how health financial protection for each group should be 
financed and progress in coverage extension monitored.  
 
<Table 4 here> 
 
 
4.1 Protecting the poor and vulnerable  
 
Cambodia introduced a user fee policy in 1996 with the aim of improving the 
capacity of the healthcare delivery system, as revenues were used to pay incentives 
to health workers, supplement the inadequate government budget, and smooth out 
irregularities of budget disbursement.  However, user fees created a barrier for the 
poor in the absence of an effective exemption system [17  18].  Since the first pilot in 
2000,The Health Equity Fund (HEF) is largely financed by donors to compensate 
health facilities for medical expenditures of the poor and pay some travelling costs, 
has been gradually scaled up, covering about 68% of the poor, or 23% of the total 
population, by 2008 [19].  Evidence suggests that the Fund has improved access of 
the poor and potentially provided financial protection.  A number of case studies 
showed a significant increase in hospital utilisation rate by genuine poor HEF 
members, without a decrease in utilisation by self paying patients after the 
introduction of the Fund.  In most cases, the number of HEF beneficiaries accounted 
for more than one thirds of the total hospital inpatients [20  21  22].  However, there 
have been questions of financial sustainability and government capacity to scale up 
using its own resources [23].    
 
The 1995 user charge policy in Lao provided provision for exempting the poor but 
this did not work well as village leaders verified the poor on an ad hoc basis.  Free 
care for the poor was a “mandate with inadequate funding”—apart from routine 
allocations for medicines and staff salary, there was no additional budget line for this 
purpose [24].  Health centres and hospitals were reluctant to subsidize the poor using 
their own revenue from user fees.  A donor funded health equity fund has been 
piloted by in 2003 and scaled up after assessment found increased utilization by the 
poor, and recent government policy dialogues have been in favour of increasing 
funding for the poor.   
 
In response to the 1997 Asian economic crisis, which hit the poor hard, Indonesia 
introduced a tax-financed targeted scheme for the poor and the near poor, including 
the homeless and orphans.  Finance is from central and district governments, and 
providers are paid on a case mix-adjusted basis for both outpatient and inpatient 
services.  Nation-wide scaling up reached 76.4 million by 2008, so almost all the 
poor and the near poor are covered.  From hospital administrative records, utilization 
has increased for ambulatory and inpatient care [25], and the rich-poor utilization gap 
 7 
has reduced.  Due to fiscal constraints, the per capita government subsidy is only 
US$ 6 per year for a package of outpatient and inpatient services compared with 
$41.8 per capita total health expenditure, and so may result in a low level of service 
provision and financial protection.  Out-of-pocket payment remains high.   
 
The Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) has introduced a sponsored 
programme since October 1997 for poor households identified and registered by local 
government.  The premium for this programme is subsidized by central (from 50% 
to 90%) and local (from 10% to 50%) governments.  However, the average share is 
80% and 20% by central and local governments respectively.  Annual enrolment has 
depended on local government political will and fiscal capacity, for example peaking 
during election years.   
 
Thailand operated a targeting scheme for the poor between 1975 and 2002 when 
universal coverage was introduced.  Initially, partial to full exemption was left to 
health worker discretion, and subsequently a means test [to verify whether an 
individual or family is eligible for help from the government] was used to identify the 
poor, initially applied by health workers and later by a local committee.  Despite the 
community involvement, nepotism resulted in under-coverage of the poor and 
leakage to the non-poor associated with local politicians [26].   
 
A common trend has emerged across the countries that health services for the poor 
are subsidized by tax through budget allocations to public providers, with additional 
support in Lao and Cambodia from donors to health equity funds.  Historically, 
means-testing to identify the poor has not been found to be very accurate [27  28],  
and this remains a challenge in the countries which rely on it.  Panel 1 compares 
targeting experiences in three countries.   
 
<Panel 1 here> 
 
 
4.2 Protecting the formal employment sector 
 
A common pattern emerges, with Indonesia, Lao, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam 
all employing mandatory social health insurance for the formal sector.  Often it is 
managed by a non-profit independent body with a clear governing structure, and 
services are purchased on behalf of members.  A percentage of the payroll is 
deducted from employees and an equal or higher contribution made by employers, 
while some governments also contribute as in Thailand.  
 
A social health insurance scheme can play a significant strategic purchasing role in 
regulating public and private provider behaviour and achieving goals of efficiency, 
quality and financial protection.  Different provider payment arrangements send 
different signals influencing doctors’ clinical decisions and provider behaviour [29].  
International experience indicates that fee for service payment stimulates 
unnecessary diagnosis, prescribing and treatment resulting in cost escalation; 
closed-end payment such as capitation and case-base payment better contain costs.   
 
The design of PhilHealth does not provide adequate financial protection for its 
members. Outpatient services are not covered; inpatient care is reimbursed up to a 
maximum ceiling, allowing “balance billing” where patients pay additional bills 
beyond the level of reimbursement.  The share of social health insurance in total 
health expenditure was 11% in 2005 and has declined in 2007 [30  31], reflecting 
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increasingly limited financial protection to members.  An increased incidence of 
catastrophic health spending [measured by >25% of non-food consumption 
expenditure of households] was also observed, from 2.11% of the total population  
in 2000 to 2.21% in 2003 and 2.97 in 2006 [32]..  PhilHealth found that 
reimbursement was only slightly more than one third of the total medical bill paid by 
patients In 2008 [33], and has determined to improve financial protection of 
members.   
 
While the PhilHealth fee-for-service model ensures free patient choice of provider, 
the Thai social health insurance scheme introduced in 1991 limits such choice 
through a capitation contract model. Members register annually with preferred public 
or private contractors and in return, contractors are paid a capitation fee, currently 
1,900 Baht (US$ 57) per member, to provide all outpatient and inpatient services. 
Balancing billing is illegal.   The scheme covers private employees only, their 
dependents falling under the universal coverage scheme, and public employees and 
dependents under a separate, non contributory scheme financed by general tax. 
 
The Thai capitation model ensures cost containment and transfers financial risk to 
providers, whereas fee-for-service transfers financial risk to PhilHealth members 
through balance billing.  The risk under capitation is inadequate services, so unit 
costs and utilization rates are monitored and members can change contractor 
annually if they are unhappy.  Studies have suggested adequate service utilization 
[34, 35, 36].   
 
Vietnam, having experienced the downside of fee-for-service such as excessive 
diagnosis and treatment and levels of copayment up to 30% of total bills, has 
introduced in 2008 a law on health insurance which provides for capitation for 
primary care services to be fully rolled out by 2015, and case-based payment to be 
used for inpatient care.   
 
Strategic purchasing, in particular design of benefit package and provider payment 
method, determines system efficiency, and level of out-of-pocket and catastrophic 
spending.  Once a payment system is entrenched, particularly where private-for-
profit providers dominate the healthcare market, radical reform from fee-for-service 
to capitation or case-based payment will face united resistance from the medical 
profession, as experienced in South Korea [37].  Introducing the right purchasing 
strategies early on is a key foundation for the successful performance of social health 
insurance.   Panel 2, on Malaysia, demonstrates some of the complexities of agreeing 
the introduction and design of social health insurance. 
 
<Panel 2 here> 
 
 
4.3 Protecting the informal sector and the rest of population 
 
The informal sector and the rest of the population make up a large proportion, for 
example, 49% in Cambodia, 64% Indonesia and 73% Vietnam. Due to the sheer 
numbers, their limited capacity to pay premiums, and the feasibility of enforcing 
payment, it is especially challenging to extend coverage to this group.  The seven 
countries have faced a key choice, between a contributory scheme and a general 
tax-financed scheme.   
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Both PhilHealth and the Vietnam social insurance scheme employ a contributory 
approach to extend coverage to the informal sector, with premiums collected from 
groups such as taxi drivers and street vendors.  PhilHealth seeks to collect a fixed 
annual premium of 1,200 Peso (US$ 25.8) from individual members, but 
enforcement is not effective despite huge effort and various innovations.  Also the 
administrative cost of premium collection is high and collection complex due to high 
mobility, and interruption and seasonality of cash income.  Adverse selection has 
been observed since members enrolling individually are mostly chronically ill and 
have high utilization rates.  This element of PhilHealth requires subsidies from the 
payroll-tax financed component.   
 
In Vietnam, tax funding is used to subsidise the premium for the informal sector by 
50%. There is a risk that coverage may stagnate once the easy-to-reach population 
has been enrolled, and the administrative cost of premium collection will be high in 
hard-to-reach remote areas.   
 
The experience of Thailand has been that despite community-based[38] and then 
publicly subsidised voluntary health insurance[39], 30% of the total population 
remained uninsured in 2001, mostly in the informal sector.  In addition to problems 
of adverse selection and financial viability [40], Thailand similarly found that it is not 
technically feasible to enforce premium payment in the informal sector.  When a 
window of opportunity arose with a political demand to reach universal coverage in a 
year as promised in the January 2001 General Election campaign, a contributory 
scheme was ruled out both on grounds of speed and because it was politically 
unpalatable due to its implications for voters supporting the new government.  The 
political context at that time provided no option but to adopt general tax–funding for 
universal coverage, though financial assessment demonstrated its feasibility at the 
time [41].  The caveat is the question of financial feasibility in the much longer term, 
as Thailand ages and population demands increase.   
 
Thailand has squeezed bottom-up by extending tax financing from the poor to the 
informal and rest of the population, while the Philippines and Vietnam have squeezed 
top-down by extending the contributory scheme from the formal to the informal 
sector.  
 
Figure 3 summarizes the achievements in insurance coverage extension by 2009 for 
three population groups (including together the informal and rest of population 
groups) in six countries.  Lao faces challenges in coverage extension to all groups, 
while Vietnam has fully covered the formal sector and the poor, but has a major 
challenge covering the informal sector and the rest of the population through a 
contributory scheme.  Cambodia has made good progress in using health equity 
funds to cover the poor though this needs to be sustained, and introducing social 
health insurance for the formal sector and devising arrangements to cover the large 
informal sector is a huge challenge both for fiscal capacity and programme 
management.   
 
PhilHealth faces two major challenges, to extend coverage to the poor by 
encouraging increased local government financial commitments, and to enrol the 
hard-to-reach informal sector into the individual contributory scheme.  Huge 
challenges in Indonesia are also coverage extension to the informal sector and the 
rest of population with a clear policy on sources of financing, while sustaining 
coverage of the poor and near-poor in a fully decentralized system.   
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It is apparent that there remains in the region a huge gap of coverage, which is a 
daunting challenge in the next wave of reform efforts.   
 
<Figure 3 here> 
 
 
5. Discussion and recommendations  
 
Table 5 summarizes achievements in the three dimensions.  Population coverage has 
been determined by willingness and capacity to subsidize the poor, enforce formal 
sector enrolment into social health insurance, and protect the rest of the population 
through prepayment, whether through tax or contributions.  The level of financial 
protection is determined by willingness and fiscal capacity to purchase a large or 
small benefit package, and by copayment policy.   
 
<Table 5 here>  
 
The estimate of insurance coverage of 76% for Philippines is from PhilHealth; a 
recent household survey estimates national coverage of 38% [42], suggesting the 
need to improve PhilHealth’s electronic membership database.   
 
All three insurance schemes in Thailand (covering the formal private sector, civil 
servants, and the rest of the population) provide a comprehensive benefit package 
with virtually no copayment. Out-of-pocket payment has decreased from 33% of 
total health expenditure in 2001 prior to universal coverage, to 17.7% in 2008 [43], 
and the reduction in the incidence and intensity of catastrophic payment has 
especially benefited poorer quintiles [44  45].   
 
With universal coverage, Thailand implemented a purchaser/provider split and 
required people to choose a local primary care unit at which to register, with their 
costs covered through capitation and case-based payment.  There is evidence that 
healthcare providers are becoming more responsive to patients [46].  Malaysia has 
retained the traditional Ministry of Health power of financing and provision.  The 
perceived lack of responsiveness of public providers has led to the high level of out-
of-pocket payments for private sector care, which is a major source of public 
concern. [47 48  49]       
 
 
Figure 4 depicts the association between insurance coverage and GGHE as percent of 
THE, and the size of bubble reflects fiscal space for each country.  Three country 
groups are apparent: tax effort more than 15% of GDP (Malaysia and Thailand), 
10% to 15% (Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia) and less than 10% (Lao and 
Cambodia).   
 
<Figure 4 here> 
 
Long term fiscal capacity to sustain the universal coverage in Thailand UC scheme is 
a major policy challenge, especially given its large benefit package.  Regular 
assessment of cost drivers and long term financial projections are required, as well 
as capacity to generate and act on evidence on adopting the cost-effective 
interventions.   For Malaysia, there is clearly a need to improve public sector 
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responsiveness and channel a much greater proportion of funding through 
prepayment arrangements. [50 51] 
 
To reduce out-of-pocket expenditure in the Philippines and Indonesia, the 
government needs to spend more on financing schemes for the poor.  The US$ 6 per 
year for a package of outpatient and inpatient services for poor Indonesians can 
cover only a very limited set of services leaving high levels of out-of-pocket 
expenditure, and the contributory premium of US$ 25.8 for the informal sector in 
Philippines also provides only a small package and thus co-exists with high levels of 
out-of-pocket payment.  General tax could be used to finance individual enrolees in 
PhilHealth, though this is major political decision as it departs from the current law.   
The government needs to broaden the tax base and diversity the sources of 
government non-tax revenue.  However, improving the current low contribution to 
people in the informal sector is consistent with the policy direction of PhilHealth.   
 
A clear message emerges from the analysis of Vietnam; the government needs to 
increase fiscal space to health in the light of consistent favourable economic 
performance in order to fulfil its commitment towards universal coverage by 2014.  
With a contributory scheme for the informal sector, government subsidies may 
increase enrolment but the hard to reach will never be covered, and at some point 
consideration of a tax financed scheme will be required in paying premium and 
enrolling the poor to the Vietnam Social Security, demanding strong political 
leadership supported by fiscal capacities.   
 
Fiscal space constraints limit coverage extension to the poor in Cambodia and Lao, 
making donor resources inevitable.  There are opportunities to harmonize and 
reorient funding from global health initiatives to strengthen health systems, in 
compliance with the Paris Declaration on aids effectiveness, in particular primary 
healthcare which can produce substantial health gains.  PHC contributes to financial 
protection and better accessed by the poor, though not adequate where high cost 
and other specialised care are not covered.  It is possible to improve the 
effectiveness of means testing through active engagement by the community 
members in identifying the poor, and Cambodian experience demonstrates the 
advantage of health equity fund demand side financing in improving the 
accountability of providers to the poor.  Removing user charges without additional 
funding to subsidize healthcare for the poor may be harmful [52].   
 
Newly established social health insurance schemes should learn from experience on 
the strengths and weaknesses of different provider payment models.  PhilHealth not 
only provides limited financial protection to its members, but also loses its potential 
monopsonistic purchasing power to steer healthcare providers to improve efficiency:   
 
“PhilHealth must move away from fee for service towards provider payment 
schemes where it can easily leverage its purchasing power of more than 18.5 
billion pesos of health care purchases in 2008’’ [53]  
 
Social health insurance in Lao, though mandatory, does not cover the full eligible 
population and efforts should be made to expand coverage.  Cambodia has yet to 
establish social health insurance to encompass the rapidly increasing formally 
employed sector.  Scaling up of community based health insurance, though it suffers 
from adverse selection, can be a temporary tool for coverage extension to the 
informal sector, as demonstrated by Thai experience.    
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Coverage extension to the informal sector and the population outside formal 
schemes is at cross road, with contributory schemes leading one way and tax 
financing another.  The choice depends on political and health systems contexts.  
Well functioning contributory arrangements require an effective government and 
administrative capacities.  When fiscal space is more favourable, the Thai case shows 
that tax financed arrangements are feasible.  See Panel 3 on key messages.  
 
<Panel 3 here> 
 
While decisions on extending coverage to the various population groups can be made 
on pragmatic grounds, it is essential to harmonize benefit package, level and 
methods of provider payments across these schemes, as members flow from one 
scheme to another and also differences are a major source of inequity.  In a 
decentralized context, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, there needs to be 
evidence on the proper balance between national and local government financing and 
roles in coverage extension.  Developing countries can learn from these experiences, 
as they have similar situations of various mechanisms or schemes for the poor, the 
formal and informal sector.   
 
Prepayment mechanisms protect people from financial catastrophe, but there is no 
strong evidence that SHI systems offer better or worse protection than tax-based 
systems [54].  However, Wagstaff [55] argues that SHI does not necessarily efficient 
partly because of poor regulation of SHI purchasers and the costs of collecting 
revenues can be substantial, even in the formal sector where non-enrolment and 
evasion are commonplace.  SHI fares badly in covering the non-poor informal sector 
workers until the economy has reached a high level of economic development.   
 
Financing reform is complex and requires context specific evidence; national 
institutional capacity to generate evidence and effective translation into policy 
decisions are vital [56  57].  However, this does not mean there is no scope for 
countries to learn from each other.  As this paper has shown and the authors have 
experienced, there are great opportunities to share experiences among countries in 
the region in the movement towards universal coverage for the betterment of 
populations.  Moreover, the issues they face, including how to improve the 
responsiveness of public services, expand social health insurance, and identify and 
protect the poor, and whether coverage of the informal sector is better done through 
contributory arrangements or tax finance, are ones faced across the developing 
world. 
 
This paper timely contributes to the current global debates on how to provide 
financial risk protection to the poor and vulnerable, how to extend coverage to the 
formal sector and the most difficult is people engaged in the informal section and 
finally how to reach universal coverage using experiences and lessons from seven 
countries in South East Asia with different pace of development.  This paper also 
provides strengths and weakness of different designs of strategic purchasing, 
debates on financing source for the informal sector between contribution by 
members and general tax.  This depends very much on the political decision, 
historical precedence and social value 
 
To conclude, government holds responsibility to protect its citizens from catastrophic 
health expenditure and impoverishment, or welfare loss from inability to use health 
services when needed.  Key messages emerged for resource poor settings, first and 
foremost extension of functional primary health care services is an initial priority by 
 13 
government as geographical access is still a major barrier; undeniably one needs to 
harmonize donor resources to strengthen primary healthcare.  Universal access to 
primary healthcare is a essential stepping stone towards achieving universal 
coverage.  Financial risk protection such as user fee exemption for the poor, effective 
identification of the poor and adequate subsidies to the poor can protect from 
financial catastrophe.  Second, the salary-based employees though the size is small, 
should be covered by payroll-tax financed scheme.  Finally, when the poor are 
adequately protected by tax-funded schemes and where fiscal capacity is feasible, 
introducing partial subsidized scheme for the informal sector can be an optimum 
choice.  These practical steps of reform should have far sight on long term 
harmonization of targeting schemes. 
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Table 1 Country background  
 Cambodia Indonesia Lao 
PDR 
Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
GNI per capita, 
PPP$ (2008) * 1,820 3,830 2,040 13,740 3,900 5,990 2,700 
GDP annual 
growth, % * 
       
 2000 8.8 4.9 5.8 8.9 6.0 4.8 6.8 
 2005 13.3 5.7 7.1 5.3 5.0 4.6 8.4 
 2008 5.2 6.1 7.5 4.6 3.8 2.6 6.1 
Fiscal space: 
government 
tax as % of 
GDP * 
8.2 12.3 10.1 16.6 14.3 16.8 13.0 
(2006) (2004) (2007) (2003) (2006) (2007) (2007) 
Poverty 
incidence, % 
below national 
poverty line** 
34.7  
(2004) 
20.2 
(2009) 
32.0 
(2002) 
27.0 
(2008) 
8.7 
(2004) 
32.9  
(2006) 
21.0  
(2000)  
8.5  
(2007) 
18.2 
(2006) 
13.5 
(2008) 
Poverty 
headcount ratio 
at $1.25 a day 
(PPP), %*** 
25.8 
(2007) 
29.4 
(2007) 
NA NA 
 
22.6 
(2006) 
NA 21.5 
(2006) 
Sources: * World Development Indicators database, April 2009, except fiscal space 
of Vietnam was analysed by the country author based on data from the General 
Statistical Office, Vietnam 
 ** Official country sources  
 *** World Development Indicators database, searching from the website 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY as of 31 August 2010  
NA: not available 
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Table 2 Key indicators of health financing, selected countries, 2007  
 
THE, 
% 
GDP 
GGH
E, % 
THE
* 
Priv. 
HE, 
% of 
THE
* 
GGHE, 
% 
gover
nment  
expen
diture 
Extern
al, % 
of THE 
SHI, 
% 
THE 
OOP, 
% 
THE 
THE 
per 
capita  
US$ 
THE 
Per 
capita 
PPP 
int. $ 
Cambodia 5.9 29.0 71.0 11.2 16.4 0.0 60.1 36.8 108.1 
Indonesia 2.2 54.5 45.5 6.2 1.7 8.7 30.1 41.8 81.0 
Lao DPR 4.0 18.9 81.1 3.7 14.5 2.3 61.7 26.9 83.9 
Malaysia 4.4 44.4 55.6 6.9 0.0 0.4 40.7 307.2 604.4 
Philippines 3.9 34.7 65.3 6.7 1.3 7.7 54.7 62.6 130.2 
Thailand 3.7 73.2 26.8 13.1 0.3 7.1 19.2 136.5 285.7 
Viet Nam 7.1 39.3 60.7 8.7 1.6 12.7 54.8 58.3 182.7 
Low income 5.3 41.9 58.1 8.7 17.5 4.6 48.3 26.8 67.0 
Lower 
middle 
Income 4.3 42.4 57.6 7.9 1.0 15.8 52.1 80.2 181.0 
Upper 
middle 
Income 6.4 55.2 44.8 9.4 0.2 21.0 30.9 487.9 757.0 
High 
Income 11.2 61.3 38.7 17.2 0.0 25.6 14.0 
4,405.
2 
4,145.
0 
GLOBAL 9.7 59.6 40.4 15.4 0.2 24.6 17.7 802.3 862.5 
Source: World Health Statistics 2010.   
*In accordance with National Health Accounts conventions, external finance is 
included within government and private shares (which sum to 100%).  
Note: THE: total health expenditure, GGHE: general government health expenditure, 
Priv. HE: private health expenditure, SHI: social health insurance, OOP: Out-of-
pocket, PPP purchasing power parity, int $: international dollar, NA not available.  
Note that private health expenditure includes OOP, private social insurance and other 
private insurance.   
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Table 3 Insurance coverage, estimates for 2009  
Population 
group 
% of total population 
 Cambodia Indonesia Lao 
PDR 
Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
1. Total 
insured, %  
24 48 8 100 76 98 55 
1.1 Formal 
public 
employees 
including 
retirees, % 
0 10 2  
 
29 
9 10 6 
1.2 Formal 
private sector 
employees, 
% 
0 5 2 26 13 7 
1.3 The 
informal 
sector, %* 
1 13 2 62 23 67 28 
1.4 The poor, 
% 
23 20 2 9 18 9 14 
2. Total 
uninsured, % 
76 52 92 0 24 2 45 
3. Total %   100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total 
population, 
million  
13.4 228.9 5.8 28.3 86.3 64.0 86.2 
Source: country official estimates  
Note * The informal sector comprises those outside formal sector employment who 
are not poor  
 17 
Table 4 Size of specific population groups, 2008  
Country The poor 
Economically active  
Rest of  
population 
Total Formal  
employed sector 
Informal  
sector 
 a b c d e 
Cambodia 35% 17% 43% 6% 100% 
Indonesia 20% 16% 29% 35% 100% 
Lao PDR 27% 14% 40% 19% 100% 
Malaysia 9% 29% 8% 54% 100% 
Philippines 33% 22% 17% 28% 100% 
Thailand 9% 27% 32% 32% 100% 
Vietnam 14% 13% 36% 37% 100% 
Note:  
o The poor (a) was calculated based on poverty incidence using a national 
poverty line, see Table 1   
o The economically active groups: the formal sector (b) and informal sector (c) 
were estimated from ILO worldwide labour statistics for 2008, 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP [accessed 25 June 2010], except Cambodia where 
the formal sector was estimated by the country author based on the 
Cambodian national population census, and Vietnam where data are for 2004.  
o The rest of the population (d) is the difference between the total population 
and the other three groups.   
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Table 5 Summary population, service coverage and financial protection, selected 
countries 2009.  
Country  Population 
coverage by 
financial 
protection 
schemes 
Health service coverage by financial 
protection schemes  
Financial 
protection for 
the whole 
population 
measured by 
OOP as % of 
THE, 2007 
Cambodia  24% The poor covered by the health equity 
fund are entitled to a comprehensive 
package, including transport cost and 
food allowance, but the scope and 
quality of care provided at 
government health facilities are rather 
limited  
60.1% 
Indonesia  48% Though the policy intention is to 
provide comprehensive services, the 
low per capita government subsidy for 
the poor of US$ 6 per year for a 
package of outpatient and inpatient 
services may result in inadequate 
service provision, high levels of self-
payment and low levels of financial 
protection.   
30.1% 
Lao PDR  7.7% In principle, comprehensive coverage 
for social health insurance and government 
employee schemes, but low level of 
funding results in a small service 
package  
61.7% 
Malaysia  100% Primary care services focus on 
maternal and child health; curative 
services are free for all.  Services are 
rationed by waiting time, and limited 
number of family physicians in health 
centres; patients opt to pay for 
private services.  Survey reports 62% 
of ambulatory care was provided by 
private clinics   
40.7% 
 
Philippines  76% Benefit package covers admission 
only except for the sponsored 
programme which also covers 
outpatient services; high level of 
copayment for all PhilHealth 
components – average 
reimbursement  is 54% of the total 
medical bill, the balance being paid 
out-of-pocket.   
54.7% 
Thailand  98% Comprehensive benefit package, free 
at point of service for all three public 
insurance schemes   
19.2% 
Vietnam  54.8% Benefit package comprehensive but 54.8% 
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substantial level of co-payment, 5-
20% of medical bills  
Source: authors’ synthesis  
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Panel 1 Challenges in targeting the poor: lessons from Cambodia, Lao and the 
Philippines  
 
In Cambodia, health equity fund beneficiaries are identified based on eligibility 
criteria either at the community level (pre-identification) or at health facilities 
through questionnaire interviews using proxy means-tests such as durable assets, 
housing, land ownership, number of working members, dependents and disabled 
members, and estimates of household income, expenditure and debt. Identification 
at point of service picks up those missed at community level.  
 
In Lao, a village committee, using certain means testing criteria, identifies poor 
households eligible for the Fund.  In non Fund areas, the village head issues a letter 
at the request of a patient, certifying him/her as poor on a case by case basis.  
Unlike Fund beneficiaries who get the cost of their free care reimbursed to hospitals, 
the poor in non Fund areas have to negotiate for exemption with providers as there 
is no budget line to subsidize free care for the poor.  In practice, some patients are 
allowed to delay payment [58].   
 
Philippine local government units use a family income test to determine who are 
indigent for a certain period, and enrol them in a programme which has budget 
subsidies covering outpatient and inpatient care.  The new government has now 
mandated the central Department of Social Welfare and Development to take this 
over, since income tests are inconsistently applied by local government units.   
 
Potential leakages to non-poor are likely in all three countries though require further 
study especially in Cambodia and Lao.   In both these two countries, supporting 
transport costs for Fund beneficiaries, in addition to medical costs, has been found to 
be essential to facilitate access to care by the poor.   
 
 
Lessons  
1. Ad hoc certification in non-Fund areas, and limited funding, are major factors 
in Lao for under-coverage of the poor.    
 
2. The health equity funds in Cambodia and Lao, with clear identification 
procedures and reliable funding, have improved utilization rates and tend to 
provide better financial protection.  Similarly, the sponsored programme of 
PhilHealth, with clear targeted funding, has improved access and use.   
 
3. In addition to the provision of basic quality health care, support of transport 
and food for poor patients during hospitalisation appears to be essential 
 
4. Objective criteria, and transparent and participatory engagement by local 
communities in identifying the poor as experienced in all three countries, 
though challenging, are essential to prevent favouritism and leakage to non-
poor. 
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Panel 2 Malaysia: unsuccessful efforts toward social health insurance [59 60]   
 
In Malaysia, an upper middle income country, health services are free for all citizens 
at primary, secondary and tertiary levels with minimum copayment, ranging from RM 
1.00 (USD 0.31) for outpatients to RM 3.00 (USD 0.94) per admission day.  The 
country spent US$ 307.2 per capita on health in 2007, using supply side financing 
through annual budget allocations to public sector providers.  Despite this relatively 
high expenditure, various problems are apparent --high levels of out-of-pocket 
payment making up 40.7% of total health expenditure, mostly spent on secondary 
and tertiary private services; long waiting times for procedures in public hospitals, 
for example 23 weeks for orthopaedic surgery [61]; rising health care costs due to 
the epidemiological transition in the face of limited public funds; and poorly 
regulated private fees.   
 
Between 1985 and 1996, the Government commissioned five reviews on health 
financing; recommendations were made that the Government should establish a 
National Health Financing Scheme to pool resources from both public and private 
sources, and provide universal financial risk protection based on social health 
insurance principles.  Discussions on health financing reform were resurrected in 
2000.  From 2000 to 2006, multi-stakeholder meetings were convened to discuss the 
National Health Financing Mechanism.  However, no decision was made and various 
barriers can be identified in addition to lack of political will:     
 
 Loser/gainer issues: the proposed introduction of social health insurance 
requires mandatory contributions by the formal sector such as civil servants 
and private sector employees who have reservations about having to pay on 
top of personal income tax.  The voices of the informal sector and the poor 
who are potential gainers from the new scheme are not heard.  Social 
solidarity mechanisms appear insufficient to overcome opposition.   
 
 Private interests: there is strong lobbying by private health insurance 
operators who fear the Scheme will dilute their profits.   
 
 Institutional conflict of interest: the proposed National Health Financing 
Authority which will administer the national scheme threatens the ministry of 
health which may lose all its financing power to the Authority.   
 
 Technical barriers: collection of premiums from the informal sector is difficult.   
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Panel 3 Key messages: 'Squeezing the middle' 
The development of a universal coverage policy is helped by explicit consideration of 
how best to cover and finance specific population groups: those in formal 
employment, the poor and vulnerable, and the 'middle' - the informal sector and the 
rest of the population.  
Those in formal employment can be given financial protection through payroll-
financed social health insurance, or tax-funded arrangements.  
It is well accepted that the poor and vulnerable require highly subsidised 
arrangements, and there is good evidence from Lao and Cambodia that demand-side 
targeted approaches such as health equity funds work better than a simple fee 
exemptions policy[62  63  64]. 
The 'middle' remains the challenge, with countries such as Philippines and Vietnam 
seeking to expand coverage through contributory arrangements, and others such as 
Thailand using tax funding.  
Comparative analysis such as that presented in this paper is helpful in bringing 
diverse experiences from the South East Asia Region together, learning lessons, and 
developing a culture of evidence in decision-making.  
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Figure 1 Achieving universal coverage  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Carrin G et al 2008 [65]  
 Universal 
coverage 
 Intermediate stages of coverage 
Mixture of tax-based and SHI financing, 
full population coverage, coverage of all 
necessary services and high level of 
financial protection 
Mix of several prepayment schemes e.g. voluntary 
community based health insurance, SHI, limited tax-
based financing, or SHI has limited financial 
protection or small service coverage 
 Early 
stages of 
coverage 
Health expenditure dominated by  
out-of-pocket spending, very 
limited scale of SHI and financial 
protection for the poor  
Population 
coverage 
Service coverage and financial protection 
Stewardship/governance and government commitment to health 
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Figure 2 Three dimensions of universal health coverage  
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Figure 3 Insurance coverage by three population groups,, 2009   
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Figure 4 Striding towards universal coverage, the role of fiscal space 
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Note: the size of bubble reflects the magnitude of fiscal space measured by tax as % 
of GDP 
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